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Boardroom Answers · Security & Compliance · Compliance, Regulatory & Legal

My executives will type colleagues' names, performance issues, and salary discussions into your platform, and you pipe that to OpenAI and Anthropic. Convince me that isn't a privacy disaster in progress.?

The question a Chief Privacy Officer / DPO asks.

The short answer

One mandatory chokepoint strips injection and redacts PII before any model call, both AI providers contractually don't train on inputs, our logs mask PII, and we're honest that pattern-based redaction has limits — which is why the layers are independent, not alternatives.

The full executive answer

It's the right fear — and it's the specific threat our AI pipeline was architected against, at a named chokepoint. Every piece of untrusted text — anything a user types, uploads, or that arrives from an external source — must pass through a sanitisation layer before any AI model sees it. That layer does two jobs: it strips prompt-injection patterns, and it runs PII redaction that detects and masks personal identifiers — emails, phone numbers, and similar direct identifiers — before transmission. The invariant is written into our engineering working agreement as a non-negotiable: never interpolate raw user text into a prompt. It's a codebase rule with a single sanctioned path, not a per-developer habit.

Second layer, contractual: both providers are accessed via their commercial APIs, whose terms exclude training on API inputs — your executives' text is processed to generate the response and is not absorbed into anyone's model weights. That's a real, enforceable DPA flow-down, and both providers are on our published sub-processor list so your team can diligence their terms directly. Third layer, containment of what we retain: PII is masked in our own logs by the logging layer itself, and the most sensitive stored fields carry KMS-managed field-level encryption.

The honest limits, stated plainly: redaction is pattern-based, and no pattern-matcher catches every contextual identifier — "our CFO in the Berlin office" identifies a person to anyone who knows the org chart, and no vendor can truthfully claim to catch that. Our layered posture assumes imperfect redaction: that's why the no-training contractual terms and the encryption exist as independent backstops rather than alternatives. And governance ultimately includes the controller's side: workspace guidance about what belongs in the platform is a control your DPO office sets, and ours amplifies. I'd also flag proactively that this intersects the EU AI Act workforce question — where executives assess employees through our modules, we've pre-built geo-gating pending counsel's classification, which is the same conservatism applied to a different statute.

Grounded in: GDPR Art. 5(1)(c) (data minimisation), Art. 28 (processor terms flow-down); OWASP LLM Top 10 LLM06 (sensitive information disclosure); EU AI Act Annex III §4 (adjacent workforce risk).

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